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Cancers like Hodgkin's disease and pediatric lymphocytic leukemia once
killed the majority of their young victims. Today's survivors owe their lives
to the luck of two scientists who accidently discovered the wonder drugs
vinblastine and vincristine while they were investigating Madagascar's wild
rosy periwinkle for other medical properties.' Since their introduction in the
early 1960's, these spectacular examples of plant-derived pharmaceuticals have
been primarily responsible for improving Hodgkin's disease remission rates
from 19% to 80% and pediatric leukemia survival rates to a once unimaginable
90%.2 The pharmaceutical literature is filled with similar examples.
Compared with the alternative, purely synthetic routes, the use of biological
sources is often both cheaper and more likely to produce breakthroughs in the
highly saturated drug market.4
1. Sam Thernstrom, Bio-diversity, GAZETTE (Montreal), Apr. 10, 1993, at B6.
2. Diane Jukofsky, Medicinal Plant Research Leads Scientists to Rain Forests, DRUG Topics, Apr.
22, 1991, at 26.
3. A "time honored route used since the beginning of pharmacology is to collect a botanical, animal
or microbial source of a possible therapeutic agent and to extract and then purify the active pharmacological
agent. Morphine (1806) quinine (1823), atropine (1833) and digitalis, are early examples ... of plant
derived medicinals." BARRIE G. JAMES, THE FUTURE OFTHE MULTINATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
TO 1990, at 61 (1977). The use of biological sources began to decline in the 1950's, however. Because few
species had been subject to any kind of systematic assay as of the late 1970's, the field still has untapped
potential. Id. at 61. A common assaying methodology "is to screen traditional herbal medicines for
unexploited natural products." EDWARD YOXEN, THE GENE BUSINESS: WHO SHOULD CONTROL
BIoTEmcNoLooY? 11 (1983).
4. New pharmaceutical research employs a variety of methodologies. One method is to synthesize
totally new structures more or less randomly and then to test them clinically for biological effects; the
highly technical lab work and clinical work makes this the most expensive investigatory route. A second,
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Unfortunately, this pharmaceutical success story has a darker side. Eli
Lilly, the corporate producer of vinblastine and vincristine, earns roughly $100
million dollars each year from these drugs--while Madagascar, the original
home of the plants in which these drugs were found, earns nothing from
them.6 As early as 1982, an estimated 50% of the prescriptions filled in the
United States were for pharmaceuticals derived in some way from naturally
occurring compounds, accounting for sales estimated at $20 billion in the
United States alone.7 Yet little or none of this goes to the countries where
these naturally occurring compounds were originally found. The inequity of
allowing multinational corporations to monopolize the profits from the
exploitation of the natural resources of less developed countries (LDC's)--the
diverse biological and biochemical legacy of the many species found or
preserved only in their wild forests or in their farmers' cultivated fields-has
until recently attracted little more than theoretical interest. However, as
more fruitful, and less expensive method bases new products on a known metabolite's structure. Even
cheaper processes skip the synthetic steps altogether. One such method is to test existing drugs for useful
new side effects; minoxidil, for example, was used as a vasodilator for cardiac patients before researchers
discovered its more profitable use as a treatment for baldness. The final method, which is the subject of
this Note, is to test naturally occurring biological substances for beneficial medical effects. See supra note
3. Such testing can be random, or it can be based on ethnopharmacological leads, i.e., information about
traditional medicinal uses of plants. Naturally occurring drugs can usually be synthesized after enough of
a sample has been obtained to isolate the active chemical ingredient and determine its structure. Synthesis
is often a cheaper way to produce a drug in bulk than natural extraction, and also ends dependence on a
supply of the source plant.
Typically I in 5000 tested compounds eventually reaches the market after overcoming hurdles such
as efficacy tests, safety tests, and market redundancy. The more hit-or-miss form of testing, usually with
existing or synthetically modified ("semi-synthetic") compounds, was more common in the United States
before the 1970's. The 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments, adding the requirement of efficacy to that of
safety for FDA approval, caused researchers to target "chronic ailments without cures," because cures for
these diseases could more easily be shown to be efficacious and, if they aimed at stopping these ailments
in the early stages, less likely to produce side effects. SURESH B. PRADHAN, INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING 41-42 (1983). Exploring natural sources generally produces more such
breakthroughs than modifying existing products.
5. Jukofsky, supra note 2, at 26; see also Norman Myers, Draining the Gene Pool: The Causes,
Course and Consequences of Genetic Erosion, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY 90, 96 (Jack R. Kloppenburg,
Jr. ed., 1988) (stating annual sales of all drugs derived from rosy periwinkle at $160 million).
6. Pharmaceutical Companies Go "Chemical Prospecting" for New Medicines, PHARMACEUTICAL
BUS. NEWS, Aug. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PBNWS File.
7. NORMAN MYERS, A WEALTH OF WILD SPECIES 90 (1983) (citing unpublished 1982 study by
Norman Farnsworth); see also Richard E. Shultes, The Future of Plants as Sources of New Biodynamic
Compounds, in PLANTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDICINE 103, 105 (Tony Swain ed., 1972)
(stating that in 1967 50% of all U.S. prescriptions were for drugs whose principal agents were naturally
derived, from higher plants (25%), from microbes (12%), from animals (6%), or from minerals (7%); the
other 50% were synthetically produced).
8. Most of the "Vavilov centers of genetic diversity" are indeed "situated predominantly in what is
now known as the Third World." These eight regions, identified first in the 1920's by the Soviet botanist
N.I. Vavilov, are defined as "centers of origin of most of the world's economically important crops."
Although the U.S. Midwestern, European Mediterranean, and the Euro-Siberian agricultural regions are
listed among the 12 current sites of such diversity (Zhukovsky gene megacenters), the crops composing
the diversity of these regions were mostly imported from other regions. Of Vavilov's eight original centers
of origin, only the Mediterranean is not currently underdeveloped. JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE
SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000, at 46 (1988); Jack R.
Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel L. Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy: National Properly Versus National
Heritage, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5, at 173, 175-81.
Plants, Poverty, and Patents
political consciousness concerning environmental issues has grown throughout
the world, LDC's have increasingly demanded some sort of equitable
compensation, often in the form of intellectual property rights, for their
farmers' preservation efforts and for national policies that forgo more
destructive forms of development, such as large-scale heavy industrialization
or clear-cut agriculture.9 Remarkably, Western pharmaceutical companies,
spurred on by the high cost and high risk of synthetic routes of drug
production, by the promise of these "biodiversity" sources, 0 and by the fear
of squandering resources, have sometimes cooperated with these demands."1
A critical drawback to the pharmaceutical use of biodiversity sources is that
the patent system has traditionally refused to protect compounds that already
exist in nature.
This combination of factors has led 167 nations, including the United
States, 2 to sign the Convention on Biological Diversity 13 (Rio Convention),
opened for signature at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. This Note
argues that the Rio Convention requires that less developed countries receive
intellectual property rights in pharmaceutically useful chemicals that are
derived from their biodiversity resources,14 and that a system of such rights
would provide a more equitable and more efficient method of valuing these
resources than any that can be achieved without such rights. 15 Unfortunately,
effective intellectual property rights in biodiversity resources cannot be created
simply by abolishing the traditional exclusion of natural products from
patentability: pharmaceutical companies have already devised methods to
circumvent the natural products exception, and these methods would also allow
9. Madagascar, an isolated evolutionary haven much like Australia, possesses "one of the most
distinctive floras and faunas in the world [but] has already lost 93% of its forest cover." E.O. Wilson, The
Current State of Biological Diversity, in BIODIvERSITY 3, 10 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
10. The pharmaceutical industry's spokespersons seemed to acknowledge that the industry was
experiencing a trough in innovation which started in the 1960's and deepened in the 1970's. From 1961
to 1973 the number of new drugs introduced onto the market dropped by a third, a phenomenon attributable
only in part to the Kefauver amendment. Daniel Chudnovsky, Patents and Trademarks in Pharmaceuticals,
in PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH IN THE THIRD WORLD 187, 188 (Surendra J. Patel ed., 1983). In 1974
FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt announced "we have temporarily exhausted the exploitations of
known concepts and tools." JAmES, supra note 3, at 74 (quoting Schmidt).
11. U.S. Biotech Companies Leery of Biodiversity Treaty, STAR TRIB., June 11, 1992, at 13A
(describing Genentech's statement opposing Rio Convention and contrary position taken by many other
pharmaceutical concerns). The article reports that many best-selling patents are scheduled to expire soon,
leaving pharmaceutical companies "peering southward." Id.; see also Julie Rovner, Rise in Prices of
Prescription Drugs Threatens Many, STAR TRIB., Aug. 10, 1992, at 4A (reporting that patents expired on
drugs with annual sales of $1.9 billion in 1992 and $2.6 billion in 1993, up from $363 million in 1991).
12. William K. Stephens, Gore Promises U.S. Leadership on Sustainable Development Path, N.Y.
TIMES. June 15, 1993, at C4. The U.S. signed the Convention on June 4, 1993, the last day it remained
open for signature. As It Signs Treaty, United States Calls for Global Patent Protection for Biotech, INT'L
ENV'T DAILY (BNA) (June 8, 1993).
13. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Rio Convention].
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
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them to circumvent biodiversity patents held by LDC's. t6 Moreover, existing
doctrines of equitable patent scope expansion may be inadequate to protect the
proposed biodiversity patent rights. Fundamental modifications in our system
of chemical patents may therefore be required in order to fulfill the aspirations
of the Rio Convention.' 7 In any event, future patent infringement
determinations must be informed by characteristics beyond mere literal
chemical structure, and such determinations should be shifted to the Patent
Office. While the changes proposed here are extensive, they have the potential
to make pharmaceutical development more efficient and responsive to diverse
worldwide needs as well as to encourage the conservation of our priceless
biological inheritance.
I. THE Rio CONVENTION
A. The Text of the Treaty: "impressively opaque"?'8
Like many modern multilateral treaties, the Rio Convention makes clear
its goals but not the means to implement them.' 9 Its aspirational values are
clear enough: the Preamble emphasizes the value of the conservation of
biological resources2" as well as the need to share fairly the profits arising
from these resources. 2' The Convention therefore seeks
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate
access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant
technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and
to technologies, and by appropriate funding.2
The Convention becomes more specific-and more worrisome to the giant
pharmaceutical concerns that lobbied against its ratification-in Article 15,
which recognizes states' sovereign rights over their natural resources, including
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), June 13, 1992, at 93, 94.
19. Unfortunately, the gargantuan United Nations document designed to explain the various treaties
approved at Rio-Agenda 21-is equally vague. See AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS (Nicholas
A. Robinson et al. eds., 1992). One reason for this obscurity is the remarkable haste with which the
Convention was drafted. See Melinda Chandler, The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest
to the International Lawyer, 4 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 141, 143 (1993); The Earth Conference:
Biodivisive, supra note 18, at 93.
20. Rio Convention, supra note 13, at 822.
21. Id. The Preamble also stresses the precautionary nature of conservation attempts: given the lack
of knowledge concerning the potential value of these resources, the Convention errs on the side of
conservation.
22. Id., art. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 823.
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"the authority to determine access to genetic resources."3 Article 15 requires
signatories to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that the results
and benefits of research utilizing genetic resources are shared fairly with the
nation of origin.24 Although Article 16 emphasizes the need to establish
access to and transfer of genetic-resource technology among Western and LDC
countries,' it fails to propose a regime to assign the resulting intellectual
property rights.26 Article 16 does acknowledge the continued existence of
intellectual property rights in this technology.27
B. The Convention in Context
A worldwide system of patent rights in genetic resources would achieve
the goals of the Rio Convention. A look at earlier attempts to create
international schemes of intellectual property rights in natural resources
provides a useful gloss on the Convention's terminology, and also illustrates
why such patent rights must be provided if the Convention is to achieve its
goals. Most conflicts over intellectual property rights in natural genetic
resources have concerned varieties of food crops, rather than the relatively
obscure area of pharmaceutically-valuable phytochemicals. 8 Conflicts
concerning food crops surfaced during the enactment of the United States Plant
Varieties Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA)29 and came to a head over the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's International Undertaking
on Plant Genetic Resources of 1983 (FAO Undertaking). 0
The plant varieties protected by the PVPA do not include the products of
traditional breeding efforts, which are not considered novel. Therefore, the
PVPA favors Western agricultural breeders over LDC breeders. The PVPA
allows commercial protection for any new species, even those that reproduce
23. Id., art. 15, § 1, 31 I.L.M. at 828.
24. Id., art. 15, § 7, 31 I.L.M. at 828.
25. Genentech, Inc. and other biotechnology companies fear that Articles 15 and 16 would turn
"technology transfer" and "equitable sharing" into compulsory licensing and intellectual property
expropriation. Article 16 requires that developed nations ensure that their "private sector facilitates access
to, joint development and transfer of technology ... for the benefit of both governmental institutions and
the private sector of developing countries." Id., art. 16, § 4, 31 LL.M. at 829. Biotechnology companies
fear that this provision, together with the Convention's financing provisions, will allow developing countries
to claim a portion of the proceeds from successful products retroactively, after the risky investment period
of development has passed. Such claims would prevent the private sector from accurately predicting future
returns from research projects that require enormous investments. U.S. Biotech Companies Leery of
Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 11, at 13A.
26. Rio Convention, supra note 13, art. 16, § 1, 31 I.L.M. at 829.
27. Id., art. 16, § 3, 31 I.L.M. at 829 (emphasis added).
28. A phytochemical is any chemical derived from a plant source.
29. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1988)). Our PVPA
actually followed the lead of 17 European nations in promoting "the commodification of the seed." See
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 130, 136-37 (1988).
30. Report of the Conference of FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 22d
Sess. 285, U.N. Doc. C 83/REP (1983) (adopting International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources).
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sexually,31 whereas the older Plant Patent Act of 1930 provides patent
protection only for asexually reproducing varieties.32 The usual subjects of
plant patent protection are sterile hybrid lines, seed for which is produced by
crossing two homogeneous sexually reproducing varieties at the seed
manufacturer's facilities. The crop produced from such seed is generally
sterile33 and thus already protected from illicit copying, so long as the trade
secrecy of the parent lines is maintained. The PVPA extended legal protection
to new varieties that had no natural protection from copying, while excluding
known varieties.
The transnational seed companies have argued that their advanced lines
deserve to receive intellectual property protection because Western breeding
utilizes more highly technical labor and the resulting products are exclusively
sold as commodities.' Conversely, their position on expanding this protection
to encompass raw germplasm, the genetic components of the great "natural"
diversity present in (mainly) Third World crops, is that it should be considered
the "common heritage of humankind,"35 the gift of nature to the present
generation. Several arguments have been advanced to explain why these
traditional breeders' lines should not be entitled to the same level of property-
right protection that the products of high-tech breeding receive. The most
significant is the claim that a wild species (or its raw germplasm) is hard to
value and thus hard to price, due to its indeterminate usefulness. Only after
some experimentation, for example, would a breeder find out if genes for
specific traits from a raw germplasm could be easily introduced into a
successful line of its own that contained the bulk of desirable genes. A strict
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1988); see also STEVEN C. WITr, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC DIVERSITY
84 (1985) (describing weaknesses in commercial protections offered by PVPA).
32. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988). Note that after 1983, judicial interpretations of the Plant Patent Act
have held that it does not preempt protection under utility patent legislation; breeders can now make use
of either type of protection. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985);
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 263.
33. Crop lines with sterile seed might seem to have limited commercial use, but in fact, high-tech
farmers often prefer the predictable features and yields produced by genetically homogeneous hybrid seed.
The sterility of the resulting crop is counter-balanced by the benefits of uniformity. High-tech farmers often
buy all their seed from a breeder, who benefits from this dependable market.
34. This commodification of the seed is a relatively new phenomenon:
[Seed trade] lobbying has successfully eliminated varietal performance as a requirement for
certification .... The key word... is not "yield" or "quality" but "choice." As one company
executive put it, the "seed industry is and always has been a merchandizing industry. After all,
we are only a few years away from the time that we all had the same public varieties to sell."
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 143 (quoting D. Kinsell). There are parallels here to the incipient
commodification by multinational drug companies of naturally occurring pharmaceuticals, which the patent
system has often but not always left in the public domain. See infra text accompanying notes 85-103.
35. MYERS, supra note 7, at 24; see also Garrison Wilkes, Current Status of Crop Plant Germplasm,
1 CRITICAL REVS. PLANT Sci. 133, 156 (1983). The phrase "common heritage of mankind" first entered
the international environmental law lexicon with Article 136 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, done at Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1293, which declares the seabed and its
resources the "common heritage of mankind." The Convention on the Law of the Sea also emphasizes the
opposition between its "common heritage" approach and a system of "sovereignty or sovereign rights" over
these resources. Id, art. 137, 21 I.L.M. at 1293. The former precludes the latter.
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regime of intellectual property protection might lead to the undervaluation
and/or underutilization of raw germplasm sources for genetic traits. Another
argument relies on the fact that Western commercial lines involve valuable
input of technical labor, which should be rewarded with legal protection under
a labor theory of property rights. By contrast, raw germplasm is only valuable
after the introduction of technical labor allows incorporation of the genetic
material into a new commercial line.36 This argument neglects the millennia
of farmers' labor invested in quite effective traditional breeding practices.
Nonetheless, in 1983 most LDC's endorsed the FAO Undertaking and
thereby accepted the idea that traditional breeders' lines should not receive the
protection afforded to commercial breeders' lines. The Undertaking strove to
produce a system of seed banks around the globe that would contain all of the
land races 37 of the underdeveloped world as well as the advanced lines of the
industrialized agricultural world. These seed banks would be open to any
breeder who needed to draw from them.
Minority voices in the underdeveloped and socialist worlds argued that
they had little to gain from such an arrangement. They contended that the
Undertaking offered a vast storehouse of diverse genetic material from the
underdeveloped "South" in exchange for genetically narrow lines of greater
technological sophistication but dubious utility from the industrialized "North."
The advanced nations would therefore lose little in the Undertaking bargain,
because recognizing all lines as the "common genetic heritage of mankind"
would still leave them in a better financial and scientific position to take
advantage of a now larger and more easily accessed gene pool. This
arrangement would, in fact, cater more to the West's commercial stake in
maintaining diversity38 than to the LDC's pressing need to raise capital for
the production of agricultural technology suited to their needs.
39
36. On these arguments generally, see Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 8, at 188-92, and
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 184-89. Another argument claims that no "resource degradation" occurs
with germplasm exploitation, as it would with depletable natural resources, since one seed contains the
entire genetic code of a native strain in a useful (reproducible) form. But this proposition is equally true
of all forms of intellectual property. See, e.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights and the Protection of Plant
Genetic Resources, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5, at 293, 303-04.
37. In the literature on biological diversity, the term "land races"is used to refer to actively cultivated
crop varieties that have been developed in traditional agricultural systems through both natural and human
selection. WrrT, supra note 31, at 23.
38. Genetically, Western crops tend to be very homogenous. This lack of genetic diversity deprives
them of collective resistance to epidemiological disasters like the Irish potato famine of the mid-nineteenth
century, the U.S. wheat stem rust epidemic of 1954, and the Southern corn leaf blight of 1970. See H.
Garrison Wilkes, Plant Genetic Resources Over Ten Thousand Years: From a Handful of Seed to the Crop-
Specific Mega-Gene Banks, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5, at 67, 73-75. Such disasters
illustrate the wisdom behind the ubiquitous slogan of biodiversity conservationists: "To keep every cog and
wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering." Aldo Leopold, The Round River, in A SAND COUNTY
ALMANAC 175, 177 (enlarged ed. 1966).
39. Continued dependence on the North's agribusiness to produce this technology would only deepen
the South's technological dependence on the North, facilitate further devaluation of genetic factors with the
creation of a one-way market, and reinforce the already divisive social differentiation among peasant
producers.
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A number of academic sociologists4' and a decided minority of LDC
specialists4' have argued that a system of national sovereignty in genetic
resources would better suit the needs of Third World agriculture. Such a
system would take the form of intellectual property rights held by the
governments of the LDC's in the name of the generations of farmer-breeders
responsible for their diversity and continued existence. National elites in the
LDC's might still reap the direct gains from such a system of property rights,
but even these gains could lead to long-term societal benefits, according to
dependency-theory models, by facilitating the development of basic scientific
research in LDC's geared towards their specific agricultural needs.42 This
system would allow effective protection of hybrid strains, which would be
impossible under the Undertaking without special exemptions.43 Given the
differences in the agricultural systems of the North and the South, a regime of
natural-resource rights might result mostly in payments between LDC's, rather
than from developed countries to LDC's, but the development of basic science
in the LDC's is a crucial step in eliminating the wide qualitative gap between
the agricultural systems of the North and the South. The FAO's 1983 position
opposes any such system of national sovereignty in plant genetic resources. Its
equivalent in the pharmaceutical field is the minimalist policy of refusing to
recognize any patent rights in this area, a policy followed by many LDC's. 4
Given that the signatories of the FAO Undertaking-the majority of them
LDC's-rejected proposals concerning national sovereignty in plant breeders'
rights in 1983,45 one might wonder why patent rights should be the preferred
protective remedy under the Rio Convention. The Convention's vague wording,
standing alone, might lead us to believe that it should be interpreted according
to the free-exchange policies encouraged by the Undertaking.46 According to
40. See, e.g., KLOPPENBURG, supra note 8, at 288.
41. Among the LDC contingent, only socialist Ethiopia voted against the Undertaking and, implicitly,
for a system of state control over genetic resources. Various nations currently claim national sovereignty
over certain crucial crops, including Brazil (over rubber varieties), Ecuador (cocoa), Ethiopia (coffee), Iraq
(date palm), and Iran (wild pistachio). Charles F. Murphy, Institutional Responsibility of the National Plant
Germplasm System, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5, at 204, 217 n.3.
42. See Daniel J. Goldstein, Biotechnology in Underdevelopment, 4 B[OfECHNOLOGY 672 (1986). See
generally Daniel J. Goldstein, Molecular Biology and the Protection of Germplasm: A Matter of National
Security, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 5, at 315.
43. Under the Undertaking, presumably even trade-secret parent lines should become accessible.
44. See, e.g., Note, Exclusions from Patent Protection, Memorandum of the International Bureau of
WIPO, 27 INDUS. PROP. 192, 192-93 (1988).
45. Apparently, the position of many LDC's on plant breeders' rights has changed. See Rebecca L.
Margulies, Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic
Resources, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 322, 344-45 (1993). Margulies argues that property rights in biodiversity
resources are consistent with existing law on property rights in plant species.
46. Before the Undertaking, no United Nations agreements directly touched on the question of rights
in germplasm/genetic resources. The one multilateral international agreement proposed in the intervening
years, the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, done at Kuala
Lumpur, July 9, 1985, available in 15 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 64 (1985), was regional in scope; all the
signatories were LDC's. It neither contained formal legal guidelines nor produced much formal legal
activity, but instead called mainly for the generation of studies. For a summary of the ASEAN agreement
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this reading, the Convention promotes the selective transfer from the North of
technologies covered by patents in those countries, in exchange for access to
the genetic resources of the South. These contractual exchanges would be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis. LDC governments would presumably
negotiate with the appropriate transnational corporations for the initial release
of the materials and would then leave subsequent protection in the hands of the
corporations. 47
A reading of the Convention in light of the debate that surrounded and
followed the Undertaking, however, produces a different interpretation.
Nowhere in the Convention is the phrase "common heritage of mankind" used
to describe biodiversity resources. Though the Preamble affirms "that the
conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind,
' 4
the insertion of the term "concern" evokes duties accompanying rights, rather
than a preference for free and open use. In fact, a general emphasis on rights
throughout the text contradicts the assertion that the Convention is hostile to
all constraints on the free exchange of germplasm. Rather, the Convention's
repeated reference to the "sovereign rights of States over their natural
resources" 49 must be read as a reference to the language of the Undertaking
minority and their academic supporters. The recent history of this phrase
allows no other interpretation. Establishing "sovereign rights" over natural
resources is the opposite of treating them as the "common heritage" of
humanity.50 The language of "sovereign rights" was so strongly associated
with the program of the Undertaking minority that its use by the drafters of the
Rio Convention can only be understood as endorsing a system of national
intellectual property rights in biodiversity resources.
II. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PATENT RIGHTS IN BIODIVERSITY
RESOURCES
Beyond the intent of its drafters, several policy considerations indicate that
the Rio Convention should be construed to require a system of patent rights
and subsequent action, see 2 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS, supra note 19, at 1162-64.
47. A U.S. State Department official was quoted as saying that he expected that now, under Rio,
"access [to genetic resources] is open, but not necessarily free," and "could be on the basis of commercial
contract." Biodiversity: A Progress Report on the Convention and the Strategy, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE
REP., Aug. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, ZEVI File.
48. Rio Convention, supra note 13, pmbl., 4, 31 I.L.M. at 822.
49. Rio Convention, supra note 13, pmbl., 5; art. 15, § 1; art. 3, 31 I.L.M. at 822, 828, 824. This
terminology was first used in the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted June 16,
1972, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 116, 118, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420, which affirmed the "sovereign right [of states
to] exploit their own [natural] resources pursuant to their own environmental policy." The nationalization
disputes that surrounded the Stockholm Declaration differed significantly from the intellectual property
issues that are the topic of this Note.
50. See supra note 35.
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in genetic resources." Effective conservation requires long-term redistributive
strategies for the development of LDC economies. Under an Undertaking-
styled scheme, however, with no patent protection for biodiversity products,
only contractual arrangements with transnational corporations will be available
to allow LDC's to exploit these resources financially. The valuation objection
to protecting raw germplasm-that its indeterminate usefulness makes it
difficult to value in advance 52-should lead to an undervaluation of this
natural resource given the greater bargaining power of the richer, more
developed countries. A property right-such as a patent-allows its holder to
accept the risk that its value will change over time. Patent rights would give
LDC's the freedom to wager that their biodiversity resources will become
more valuable over a longer time horizon. Denied this alternative, LDC's will
be forced to accept the lower up-front offers a contractual natural-resource
exploitation agreement brings.
Above these problems looms a more practical one: contractual regimes to
protect intellectual property rights are easily circumvented, especially when not
every player is a party to the contract. Given their generally inadequate law
enforcement resources, LDC's may be unable to prevent companies from
smuggling out samples of biological material. Furthermore, competing
pharmaceutical companies may simply "steal" from each other. Most natural
products are not patentable and may be freely copied by the competitors of a
company contracting with an LDC.53 This threat almost certainly serves to
lower the value of the deal to the contracting LDC.
So-called "chemical prospecting" contractual agreements, which appeared
on the scene at the same time as the Rio Convention was being negotiated,
illustrate the problems inherent in pure contractual regimes. 4 Perhaps spurred
on by deforestation or by a desire to affect the course of the Rio negotiations,
at least two U.S. drug companies, Merck & Co. and Shaman Pharmaceuticals,
have contracted with Latin American nations to gain access to virgin biological
raw material in exchange for a share in the profits from any resulting products.
Both companies intend to file patents on influenza and herpes antiviral agents
derived from native plants. Shaman, a small start-up operation with a nonprofit
51. The Bush Administration, it should be noted, seems to have read the treaty this way: "The White
House argued that this language [calling on countries to share 'in a fair and equitable way' the results of
biochemical research, Rio Convention, supra note 13, art. 15, § 7, 31 I.L.M. at 828] eroded the patent
rights of American companies that wish to study the flora and fauna that happen to exist in poor countries."
Marcia Coyle et al., U.S. Rio Stance Said to Hurt Competitiveness, NAT'L L.L, June 22, 1992, at 5.
52. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
53. Drug companies already have many effective strategies to circumvent the exclusion of naturally
occurring products from patentability. These strategies, discussed in detail in Part II of this Note, may also
help third parties undercut the exclusivity of a contractual agreement t;, transfer genetic resources from an
LDC to a corporate pharmaceutical concern. This subvertibility contributes to the undervaluation of the
resource.
54. William K. Stevens, Shamans and Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at
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arm, plans to deal largely in extracts from materials harvested continuously
from LDC's.15 Merck, however, paid an up-front $1 million "prospector's
fee" 56 plus a small royalty fee57 to the National Biodiversity Institute
(INBio), a Costa Rican government organ. In exchange, Merck has received
the right to exploit a limited territorial area for new drugs, with the cooperation
of the government and of indigenous experts who will recover samples of
medicinally useful plants that INBio will then forward to the company."
Merck will retain patent rights to products developed under this agreement. 9
From Merck's point of view, this contract to exchange genetic resources
for a share of the profits from their exploitation is made less valuable by the
fact that its "exclusive" right to exploit the samples sent it by the Costa Rican
government can be undercut by other drug companies. Once Merck's product
reaches the market, other drug companies could fairly easily determine the
structure of the active chemical ingredient. 60 These competitors would then
be in the same position that Merck had been in after it had processed the
original plant samples to determine the structures of their active
pharmacological agents. Moreover, because of the naturally occurring
substance exception to patentability,61 Merck might have no recourse to
patents to protect the drug it had "exclusively" contracted to develop. Without
a guarantee of exclusivity, enforceable only by patent rights accruing to one
of the contracting parties, Merck would receive only a slight head start on its
competitors in exchange for its prospecting fee and royalty payments.62 The
55. Small Companies... Shaman Pharmaceuticals, PREDICASTS HEALTH Bus., Sept. 27, 1991, at 31.
56. Birds and Bees, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), May 30, 1992, Survey Section, at 15, 17.
57. The amount of this royalty has not been disclosed, but one report estimates that it is between one
and three percent on any product developed. Pharmaceutical Companies Go "Chemical Prospecting" for
New Medicines, supra note 6. Costa Rica promises that it will reinvest fifty percent of these royalties "in
conservation." A Merck spokesperson, Jeff Goldstein, claimed in August 1992 that "[b]ecause there are so
few [prospecting] agreements[,] it seems that [Merck's deal] is becoming a model." However, he added that
screening in this way is a "high-risk venture," and that it is not known whether the company will find
anything useful. Id.
58. Stevens, supra note 54, at Cl. These local experts are the "bushmasters" who collect medicinal
plants for the shamans. A typical bushmaster in Belize earns anywhere from two to ten times the typical
farmer's income. Id at C9. Insect samples are also part of the deal. See Coyle et al., supra note 51, at 5.
59. Pharmaceutical Companies Go "Chemical Prspecting "for New Medicines, supra note 6; Graeme
Browning, Biodiversity Battle, 24 NAT'L J. 1827, 1828 (1992). These patents, if approved, would be of the
sort assigned to compounds that, while occurring in nature, were nonetheless previously unknown in their
purified and isolated form and are therefore not subject to the exclusion from patentability of naturally
occurring substances. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
60. The ease of reverse engineering chemical structures is the reason trade secret protection would be
ineffective for maintaining the exclusivity of such contractual arrangements.
61. See infra Part InI.
62. It took Merck eighteen months to isolate its antiviral product from the natural raw materials.
Stevens, supra note 54, at Cl. Once the finished product reaches the market, competitors would probably
need only a few weeks to determine the chemical structure of the active ingredient by using advanced
spectroscopic techniques like 2D-NMR (two-dimensional nuclear magnetic resonance). On 2D-NMR, see
generally W. McFarlane & D.S. Rycroft, Multiple Resonance, 16 ANN. REP. NMR 293 (1985). Simpler
technologies (e.g., x-ray crystallography, mass spectroscopy, IR and UV spectroscopy, simple test reactions)
can in combination also yield quick results given some idea of a structure with which to begin. In any
event, the chemical structure of a pharmaceutical product must ordinarily be published. See 21 U.S.C.
1993]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 223
value of this head start pales beside that of a seventeen-year monopoly on
production and use.63
The disparity between the potential value of any pharmaceuticals that
might be developed as a result of this prospecting agreement and the
compensation that Costa Rica would receive presents an economic problem
that must be solved by any scheme to create incentives for conservation. The
root of this problem is not the undervaluation of Merck's inventive effort.
Merck's competitors will have made approximately the same effort to bring
their competing analogues to market. Nor is the problem the undercutting of
Merck's capital investment. If its antiviral makes it to market, Merck will have
underpaid vastly: one million dollars is a small sum weighed against the
finances needed to gain regulatory approval for a new drug; and the unofficial
royalty figure of one to three percent is small by pharmaceutical industry
standards,64 even if all that has been gained is a jump on the marketing
end.65 Rather, the problem is that the total contribution to the general welfare
made by the introduction of the drug into the market is being undervalued. It
is the LDC's natural resource, the knowledge of the structure of the drug, that
is thereby undervalued. The conservation goals of the Rio Convention would
be more effectively fulfilled if the LDC's property rights were broad enough
to extract the full economic rents from those who benefit from its genetic
resource. The LDC should have some form of patent right extensive enough
to cover the entire value that the contracting pharmaceutical producer-and any
free-riding competitors-gained from the discovery.
66
§ 355(/) (1988). Once a competitor has determined the chemical structure, it has to perfect a laboratory
synthesis. The time scale for this would probably be slightly longer, perhaps a few months for a moderately
complicated molecule. The bulk of the lead time advantage accruing to Merck would come from this delay
if the competitor's proposed product were allowed to benefit from the safety and efficacy testing results
accumulated by Merck; the latter process ordinarily takes several years, but under the 1984 Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, the process is greatly accelerated if the product being tested
is shown to be "bioequivalent" to a pharmaceutical that has been already approved but is no longer on
patent. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1988) (defining patent infringement in relation
to FDA testing data). Bioequivalent drugs are basically generic-brand versions of previously approved
products, equally potent and absorbed into the bloodstream at the same rate. They "are not required to
replicate the extensive clinical trials that have already been used in the development of the original, brand-
name drug," but rather only need satisfy the lesser conditions for approval of "abbreviated new drug
applications." Jeffrey Yorke, FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Sept. 1992,
at 11, 14.
63. Of course, the value of any patent depends upon its scope. In the pharmaceutical industry, a
competitor may be able to circumvent the seventeen-year monopoly on the production and use of a patented
drug by creating a semisynthetic analogue to that drug. The second half of this Note addresses the thorny
issues of patent scope that are raised by this practice. See infra Parts II-IV.
64. See supra note 57. The typical royalty range for undeveloped drug products is two to four percent,
and not all biodiversity products will be so risky. Victoria McNamara, Researchers Cash in on Biotech
Laws, HOUSTON Bus. J., July 3, 1989, § 1, at 1.
65. This lead time can, however, be extremely valuable. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
66. This argument turns on a use-value determination which, like all use-value determinations, is
difficult to pin down empirically. Since synthetic pharmaceuticals are much more expensive to bring to
market than phytochemical pharmaceuticals, it may be safe to assume that the cost of producing an
acceptable substitute sets a very high upper limit on the rent-seeking activity of such LDC resource
monopolists. Such valuations involve "the complex types of preferences involved when one is dealing with
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Of course, the disparity between the ex ante payments to the LDC's by the
prospecting companies and the returns generated by the rare "find" may be
seen as a form of insurance payment, working to protect individual LDC's
from the possibility that their phytochemical harvest will produce only
valueless duds, while some other countries' plants will bear the few viable
drugs found in a given year.67 In exchange for the bargain, the transnational
drug company assumes this risk, which it may be better equipped to bear than
an impoverished LDC would be. The skimming of economic rents from these
resources by transnational corporations might be thought to be justified by their
assumption of this risk; in fact, such contractual exploitation arrangements,
while having a lower overall value to the LDC resource "owners," may in fact
fit better into the equitable redistributive scheme envisioned by the Rio
Convention, since a larger number of LDC's would be assured of a more
regular stream of income. Given the blockbuster-oriented nature of modem
drug development, income regularity is a plausible concern. 68 However, this
arrangement also transfers the initiative from the resource holder to those on
the marketing end, and it could also redistribute conservation funds to some
nations whose resources might be less worth saving. Moreover, a collective
national property scheme involving risk-spreading among several LDC's could
accomplish the same goals.69 All things considered, a deal as one-sided as
Merck's appears to be the result of a severe imbalance of bargaining power:
the enormous wealth of a multinational corporation matched 'against the
enormous financial need of a developing nation for preserving biodiversity and
for developing its own pharmaceutical industry.
uncertain and intertemporal outcomes." v. Michael Hanemann, Economics and the Preservation of
Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSITY 193, 197 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988). This is the origin of the dilemma
presented by attempts to put an economic value on biodiversity.
67. Given ex ante valuation problems of this type in voluntary contractual agreements, biotechnology
companies' worries are understandable. They fear that the Rio Convention, especially Article 16 and its
"equitable sharing" provisions, will allow LDC's to claim a portion of profits retroactively, after
development of the drug has progressed to the marketing stage and the attendant huge capital commitment
has already been made. See U.S. Biotech Companies Leery of Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 11, at 13A.
68. See Scott Cahill et at., Have Pharmaceutical Companies Missed the Boat on Biotechnology?, MED.
MARKETING & MEDIA, Jan. 1992, at 28, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MEDMKT File (stating that
blockbuster drugs actually subsidize other drugs and that biotechnology firms have the greatest potential
for creating blockbusters).
69. Rights could be assigned to multinational LDC organizations like the Andean League, to
multinational economic organizations, or to one of the bodies spawned by the Convention itself. Article
16 of one proposed draft of the Convention apparently contained an explicit option to establish a
specialized unit to collect specimens, to evaluate commercial applications of the collected specimens, and,
finally, for the Secretariat to apply for intellectual property rights over any discoveries or inventions arising
from such evaluations. Royalties would be invested in a fund for preserving biodiversity. These rather
paternalistic proposals of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) were eventually
rejected. See Draft Articles Prepared by IUCN for Inclusion in a Proposed Convention on Conservation of
Biological Diversity and for the Establishment of a Fund for that Purpose with Explanatory Notes, Draft
6, June 1989 (unpublished), cited in Kathryn Rackleff, Preservation of Biological Diversity: Toward a
Global Convention, 3 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 405, 406 n.7 (1992).
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The great difference in value between arrangements for exploiting
biodiversity resources which are founded on property rights and those which
are not will make the patent (property rights) model far more effective in
implementing the redistributive goals of the Rio Convention, at least over the
long run. A system based on the patent model would provide the sovereign"
within whose territory the biodiversity resource is first found with patent-like
rights,7" that is, with exclusive rights to enjoin use for an arbitrarily fixed
term.7" The goal of the system would be to improve the bargaining position
of underdeveloped resource holders against the wealthy transnational
companies that have the expertise and capital to develop those resources.
Exclusive ownership of intellectual property rights would allow LDC's to
extract the full economic rents for their resources from the transnational drug
companies, which would either have to pay near-monopoly prices or go
through the expensive and risky process of creating a synthetic substitute for
the natural biodiversity pharmaceutical. At the same time, a drug company
could protect its investments in specific biodiversity research by negotiating
an exclusive licensing agreement with an LDC that would allow the company
to enjoin its competitors from using that genetic resource. Under such a
property-rights system, market mechanisms would assure the bargaining
position of LDC's without any need for a paternalistic bureaucracy to oversee
the resulting licensing arrangements.73 Creating such rights on an international
70. The rights could also be held by a group of sovereigns, or by sub-sovereign groups, e.g.,
indigenous peoples whose collective ethnobotanical knowledge is used to identify useful species. Also,
these "patents" need not be limited to LDC sovereigns. Certainly, biodiversity resources do exist in
developed countries and will be exploited; the Clinton administration recently created a domestic biological
survey project in the Department of the Interior. As It Signs Treaty, United States Calls for Global
Protection for Biotech, supra note 12. This is not problematic to a biodiversity patent scheme; attaching
value to biodiversity resources will encourage their conservation wherever they are.
71. In the United States, this type of biodiversity "patent" system might be subject to constitutional
attack as granting patent rights to a non-inventive product. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the proposed
regime could be implemented via a distinct statute that adds restrictions in order to differentiate the right
granted from patent rights, as with the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1988); see also
Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 304-05 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that Orphan Drug Act covers
unpatentable products). Such a statute could clearly state that the system is being established pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, rather than the Copyrights and Patents Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72. Because the tropical species relevant for chemical prospecting tend to be restricted in range of
habitat, the entire population of a species providing a useful chemical will often be confined within the
borders of one country. E.O. Wilson, supra note 9, at 1I. The reasons why these species are less dispersed
than their temperate counterparts are discussed in Richard B. Norgaard, The Rise of the Global Exchange
Economy and the Loss of Biological Diversity, in BIODIVERsrrY, supra note 9, at 206, 209, and in
Therustrom, supra note 1, at B6. Whether or not these chemicals would occur in an unrelated plant species
elsewhere is a different question, the answer to which will probably vary depending on how distinctive the
chemical structure in question is.
73. Neither less developed countries nor pharmaceutical companies relish the prospect of a supervisory
bureaucracy; faced with this alternative, both would prefer a property-rights system. Underdevelopment
theorists support property rights as an effective vehicle for encouraging autonomy in the rights holder. See,
e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 771 (1964). As for the pharmaceutical
companies, in the days prior to the Rio Summit one executive was quoted as saying that, while he had
not come across any opposition from drug manufacturers to paying royalties to countries for
successful drugs derived from their plant species, . . . [t]he great concern is that [once the
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scale would, of course, require the municipal legal systems 74 of the
participant nations to manifest a genuine commitment to protecting rights in
biodiversity natural resources, as well as a genuine commitment to strong
intellectual property protection generally.75 Whether the patent system of the
United States can provide biodiversity patents with strong intellectual property
protection is the question the remainder of this Note will address.
III. THE NATURAL PRODUCTS EXCEPTON: HAS IT ALREADY PREPARED
FIRMS TO CIRCUMVENT A BIODIVERSITY PATENT SYSTEM?
As it exists today, patent law in most nations excludes from patentability
all "products of nature, 76 including chemical structures. Overcoming the
obstacle this poses for effective biodiversity patents requires more than adding
a new exception to an exception, because the traditional exclusion has
prompted pharmaceutical companies to develop strategies to evade the
unpatentability of products of nature. These same strategies may also have
prepared drug companies to undermine the effectiveness of the biodiversity
patents proposed here. This Part begins with an analysis of the naturally
occurring substance exception in current patent law. It then examines the
"semi-synthetic" methods that pharmaceutical companies already use to evade
the spirit of this exception, methods that these companies could potentially use
to undermine the spirit of a Rio scheme as well.
convention becomes formally operational] a horrendous bureaucracy will emerge. The result will
be that if a company wants to move germplasm out of the country there will be so much form
filling and red tape that the exercise will not be worthwhile.
Biodiversity Treaty May Restrict Commercialization, BIOTECHNOLOGY Bus. NEWS, July 3, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BIOBUS File.
74. The transnational patent system, to the extent that it exists at all, is the product of convergence
between the municipal patent systems of individual nations, a convergence often motivated by external
economic coercion in the form of trade sanctions. (The genuinely transnational system established by the
European Patent Convention is one exception.) The two major transnational patent institutions are the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr).
The United States, having found WIPO ineffectual in aiding its past efforts to strengthen intellectual
property protection worldwide, has generally sought to use GAIT as a vehicle for harmonizing world patent
systems. The Swiss proposed using GATr to enforce standards established by WIPO, but U.S.
policymakers rejected this proposal's continued emphasis on WIPO. Michael B. Smith, The Uruguay Round
and the Intellectual Property Agenda, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN
THE NEXT DECADE 163, 166-68 (Charls E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfeld eds., 1988).
75. This includes the rights of pharmaceutical manufacturers in nations that undermine or refuse to
allow pharmaceutical patents. The Reagan Administration estimated that U.S. businesses lose some $60
billion annually to piracy of patents and other intellectual property. Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. to Offer
Proposals to Fight Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1988, at 38. This amount is of a comparable magnitude
to the contemporary estimate of the sum that a biodiversity patent scheme could potentially redistribute:
total world pharmaceutical sales were $127 billion in 1987. See Robert Teitelman, Global Report on
Pharmaceuticals, FIN. WORLD, May 30, 1989, at 54, 55. By some estimates, 50% of these sales are
attributable to natural sources. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
76. The terms "product of nature," "naturally occurring substance," "natural substance," etc., are used
synonymously.
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The patent laws of most nations distinguish "between 'discovery' and
'invention' and exclude mere discovery from patentability.' 77 Simply isolating
a chemical substance from nature is usually considered unpatentable
"discovery." When pharmaceutical companies discover a useful chemical in
nature, they often find it more convenient to produce the same substance in
marketable quantities through synthetic means.78 However, a synthetically
produced chemical with the same structure as a natural compound is generally
not patentable. In a leading nineteenth-century case that is still good law, the
Supreme Court held that a product differing from a substance occurring in
nature only in that it is synthetically made does not meet the test for novelty
and is therefore unpatentable.79
This rule permits an exception: if the product was "previously unknown
in its purified and isolated form," it may be patentable as a substance, not just
as a purification process.80 This exception continues to hold despite the
relative ease of most modem purification and isolation processes. Artificially
created substances of such higher purity that they "differ not only in degree but
in kind" from the identical known natural substance are patentable."' The
leading case in this area concerned claims for crystalline vitamin B12,82 which
does not exist in nature because B, 2 crystal structure is undermined by the
slightest impurities. At the patented purity level the product is medicinally
useful. To qualify for this type of purification patent, the level of purity should
ideally be high enough to allow the product to be distinguished "in kind" by
the words of the patent claim-here, conveniently, the product could be
described as BI2 in crystalline form. In addition, the transformed product must
demonstrate "unexpected properties. 83
77. R. Stephen Crespi, Inventiveness in Biological Chemistry: An International Perspective, 73 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 351, 355 (1991).
78. See supra note 62 on the procedure involved.
79. Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1884) (alternative holding)
(citing The Wood-Paper Patent, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593 (1874) (incorrectly cited as 23 How.)).
80. Charles Berman & Nancy Lambrecht, Can You Patent a Product That Occurs Naturally?, 104 L.A.
DAILY J., Feb. 15, 1991, at 7. The European standard allows patentability in cases where the product is
"new in the sense that it was not previously available to the public." However, "[n]otwithstanding these
generally agreed lines, the standards for patentability may be stricter in some European countries." Carlos
M. Correa, Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 154, 155
& n.8 (1992).
81. In re Merz, 97 F2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938). An earlier case held, per Learned Hand, that
adrenalin was transformed by the patentee's purification process into a useful drug, "for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically." Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189
F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (upholding
patent on the purified product).
82. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958); see also Merck &
Co. v. Chase Chem. Co., 273 F. Supp. 68 (D.N.J. 1967) (upholding same claim).
83. Ex parte Gray, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1924 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989) (holding
recombinant product unpatentable, although purer than product isolated from natural source, because
absence of natural contaminants produced no unexpected effect). It is unclear what level of change in form
or utility is sufficient to meet these tests. This ambiguity seems to have been intentionally shifted over from
the question of what gradation of purity is a sufficient advance. See Olin, 253 F2d at 164.
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Pharmaceuticals derived from the plant sources that the Rio Convention
aims to protect are unlikely to meet the conditions for patentability in the
present system. Since most of these phytochemicals will have been discovered
in a plant already known to be medicinally useful (e.g., by native experts in
the Merck prospecting agreement), the purified or synthetic pharmaceutical
would have to show some qualitative leap in clinical efficacy in order to
qualify for a patent under the "unexpected properties" condition.
Precisely because it has been so difficult to obtain patents on synthetic
(and therefore mass-producible) versions of naturally occurring
pharmaceuticals, the practice of adding small modifications to the chemical
structure of the original compound has become widespread.'M This process
typically involves discovery of the natural compound's chemical structure and
the laboratory synthesis to duplicate it. Through a process of trial and error,
the patent-seeker then tries to create a "new" chemical that has a slightly
different structure but duplicates the beneficial effects of the original.
Three possible explanations account for the pharmaceutical industry's
extensive use of this practice. The first is that structural modification of known
metabolites has historically been an effective strategy for developing new
drugs.' Antibiotics, for example, are often found in nature in an unstable or
otherwise therapeutically useless form, which slight chemical structure
modifications may convert into a more potent version.86 The new compound,
if not itself known to be naturally occurring, is-and should be-patentable.
Apparently slight structural modifications can also sometimes produce radical
changes in the clinical effect of a known metabolite. Steroids are a frequent
target of this sort of research, since all the members of this huge class of
hormones are based on a common four-ring carbon framework.
Although drug companies may want to claim that a search for "superior
biological properties" underlies all aspects of their research, two other
explanations lead to the conclusion that such practices are of more dubious
social utility. The peculiarities of marketing in the pharmaceutical industry
often justify the development of look-alike chemical analogues to existing
drugs, despite the huge cost of obtaining regulatory approval for the new
variants. Modifying old top-sellers can allow for niche-marketing in profitable
and competitive fields, such as tranquilizers.8 7 Incremental improvements may
84. Sometimes the following difficulty is encountered:
[N]aturally occurring chemicals can not be patented once their structures have been published.
Active compounds that are discovered and characterized by university researchers are often
published in scientific journals before patents are granted. Drug companies are then forced to
spend time and money finding novel derivatives with the same effect, so they can patent them.
Medicinal Plants: Pills in a Haystack, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), Feb. 24, 1990, at 87. On the treatment
of publication generally in the United States, see 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1988).
85. JAMES, supra note 3, at 62.
86. Id. at 62-63.
87. PRADHAN, supra note 4, at 42-45.
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increase sales in a category when new drugs can be marketed to doctors under
the label "new and improved";88 firms can take advantage of the old
trademark (whose use continues to be protected even after the patent expires)
by giving the new versions related marks. These strategies are of significant
benefit because the drug business is so marketing-intensive: some 20-25% of
drug company revenues go into advertising.8 9 For this reason, firms "often
rush a product to market in order to be first with it and then replace it later"
with a more refined relative.' The publicity accruing to technological
advances in the medical field and the head start on establishing trademark
recognition benefits the product. In the long run, trademark recognition is often
the most valuable intellectual property right a pharmaceutical company obtains
in a breakthrough drug.91
Finally, the desire to evade the product-of-nature patent restriction
motivates much of this research. The huge cost of securing FDA approval for
a new pharmaceutical compound increases the risks of trying to market a new
but non-patentable naturally occurring drug. The effort and delay involved in
finding a "novel" derivative with the same effect is often worth the trouble,
because this marketed version, and the huge investment required for safety and
efficacy testing, can be protected by a patent.92 One recent example of this
phenomenon involves the drug lovastatin, which blocks the body's synthesis
of cholesterol. Lovastatin represented a breakthrough in the control of
88. Id. at 45.
89. Chudnovsky, supra note 10, at 190. This phenomenon is statistically obscured, as "development"
takes an ever-increasing share of "research and development" investment dollars. JAMES, supra note 3, at
81. Nonetheless, industry-wide, "overhead and promotion budgets... amount to 25% of sales, vs. R&D's
16%." John Carey et al., A Bitter Tonic for Drugmakers? BUS. WK., Mar. 8, 1993, at 84, 84.
90. PRADHAN, supra note 4, at 45 (citing MICKEY C. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MARKETING 133 (2d ed. 1975)).
91. All pharmaceuticals have a chemical name, which is an intricate formal description of the actual
chemical structure in words (e.g., 2,4-pyrimidinediamine, 6-(t-piperidinyl)-,3-oxide), a generic name which
is a shortened version commonly used by scientists in most writings (e.g., minoxidil), and a trademarked
or brand name (e.g., Rogaine or, in Europe, the more descriptive Regain) for consumers, including doctors.
See infra note 95 for another example. Advertisements to doctors tend to concentrate on the trademark
names, because of their unlimited length of protection-by the time a drug reaches the market it may only
have a few years remaining on its patent protection, often too short a period of time in which to recoup
the investment made. Forty percent of all trademarks worldwide attach to pharmaceuticals and associated
goods. Chudnovsky, supra note 10, at 190-92. In absolute terms, this covers 50,000-80,000 trade names;
for 700 different drugs in the U.S. market there are some 20,000 trade names. Worldwide the average is
70 per drug. Aurelie von Wartensleben, Major Issues Concerning Pharmaceutical Policies in the Third
World, in PHARMACEUTICALS AND HEALTH IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 10, at 169, 170.
92. As of 1985, it cost an average of $94 million to prove a single drug safe and effective. JAMES A.
DUKE, HANDBOOK OF NORTHEASTERN INDIAN MEDICINAL PLANTS, at xi (1986). According to the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, the total cost of bringing a drug to market today is on average
$231 million. Rovner, supra note 11. These costs are often cited as a reason for the lack of interest
displayed by U.S. manufacturers towards biodiversity drug sources. See, e.g., DUKE, supra, at xi (citing the
high cost as "one simple reason, if not the only reason, that the pharmaceutical companies in the U.S.
prefer to come up with synthetic compounds which they can patent, even though the synthetic may be a
copycat, template, or derivative of the naturally occurring compound").
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hypercholesterolamia when it was discovered in 1980.93 Over 8000 strains
of microorganisms were tested in the search for a drug to block the enzyme
HMG CoA from converting acetate into squalene, a key reaction in the
synthetic route the body uses to manufacture cholesterol.94 A fungal
metabolite, lovastatin95 (pictured in Figure 1), was the first effective inhibitor
of HMG CoA found. Lovastatin's function derives from the fact that its
physical structure makes it attractive to the spot on the enzyme that ordinarily
attracts its natural substrate, acetate.96 Merck, the first to discover this
characteristic of lovastatin, used a general knowledge of enzyme behavior to
surmise what was later discovered to be true: that the dihydroxyl group (at the
top of the molecule in Figure 1) was crucial to the "structural activity
relationship" with the enzyme.97 This meant that the lower end of the
molecule could probably be modified slightly without destroying the HMG
CoA-inhibiting effect. Merck added a methyl group 98 to this nether-end and
called the "semi-synthetic" resulting compound "simvastatin" (pictured in
Figure 2).9'
Merck has chemical structure patents on both drugs and has marketed them
simultaneously since simvastatin's market introduction on January 13,
1992.1°° Bristol-Myers Squibb has also marketed an HMG CoA inhibitor
93. A.W. Alberts et al., Mevinolin: A Highly Potent Competitive Inhibitor of Hydroxymethylglutaryl-
coenzyme A Reductase and a Cholesterol-lowering Agent, 77 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC!. USA 3957 (1980).
A Merck group received U.S. Patent No. 4,231,938 on their discovery of lovastatin, then called
"Mevinolin," which they had derived from the microfungus Aspergillus terreus. A Japanese group
simultaneously discovered the same drug and dubbed it "Monacolin K" after the bacterium, Monacus ruber,
from which they had derived it. See Aldra Endo, Monacolin K, A New Hypercholesterolemic Agent
Produced By A Monascus Species, 32 J. ANTIBIOTICS 852 (1979); Akira Endo, Monacolin K, a New
Hypercholesterolemic Agent That Specifically Inhibits 3-Hydroxy-3-Methylglutaryl Coenzyme A Reductase,
33 J. ANTIBIOTICS 334 (1980). Aspects of the discoveries that the Japanese group reported are protected
by U.S. Patent No. 4,323,648.
94. FJ. ZEELEN, MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY OF STEROIDS 56 (1990). HMG CoA is 3-hydroxy-3-
methylglutaryl coenzyme A reductase. Id.
95. "Lovastatin" is the generic name, "Mevacor" the brand name/trademark, and "[la(R"),3c,703,8P3
(2S',4S'),8a[3]-2-methylbyutanoic acid 1,2,3,7,8,Sa-hexahydro-3,7-dimethyl-8[2-(tetrahydro-4-hydroxy-6-oxo-
2H-pyran-2-yl)ethyl]-l-naphthalenyl ester" the chemical name. Id. at 70.
96. This spot is called the "active site." On the functioning of enzymes generally, see ALBERT L.
LEHNINGER, PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMiSTRY 207-43 (7th ed. 1982). Lovastatin has 10,000 times the affinity
of the natural substrate for HMG CoA's active site. ZEELEN, supra note 94, at 56.
97. ZEELEN, supra note 94, at 56; Ta-Jyh Lee, Synthesis, SARs and Therapeutic Potential of HMG-
CoA Reductase Inhibitors, 8 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 442 (1987).
98. A methyl group is the smallest of the alkyl groups, the most stable class of carbon-containing
functional groups in organic chemistry.
99. ZEELEN, supra note 94, at 56-57. Simvastatin is marketed under the trade name "Zocor." Merck
Submits NDA for Treatment of Elevated Serum Cholesterol, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 16, 1987, available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library, PRNEWS File [hereinafter Merck Press Release] (release by Eleanor Paradowski
of Merck).
100. Alice Cantwell, Merck to Introduce Drug to Lower Cholesterol Levels, J. CoM., Jan. 9, 1992, at
7A. Simvastatin illustrates the long time frame required to introduce a new pharmaceutical into the market:
Merck had first filed the patent application for simvastatin in 1986 and had submitted the FDA New Drug
Application (NDA) in October 1987, Merck Press Release, supra note 99, years before it began marketing
the drug in 1992. It appears that the new level of purity of lovastatin was such that, for practical purposes,
it did not "previously exist." (The fact that the fungus probably did not have an LDC source also makes
this example somewhat less than perfect.) The patent claims that the microfungus involved in the










Merck/Alberts group discovery was of a "hitherto unidentified" variety of the genus Aspergillus. U.S. Patent
No. 4,231,938. Also, both this and the Endo group patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,323,648, claimed the product
as well as the cultivation/fermentation (i.e., natural) processes for making them.
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under the trade name "Pravachol."' 0' According to an independent analyst,
"Pravachol, Mevacor [lovastatin], and Zocor [simvastatin] are functionally
compatible; none has an inherent chemical advantage."'0 2 John LaRosa, the
head of the AMA Cholesterol Task Force, predicts that pricing will
increasingly determine market share as more HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors
come onto the market, "unless there is some clinically significant
differentiation-and there doesn't really seem to be."' 3
IV. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF COPYCAT SUBSTANCES
Merck's patent on simvastatin's structure shows how easy it is to evade
the naturally occurring product exception. Patents on drugs do not attach to the
specific biological activity that they have-which is in any case very difficult
to determine with anywhere near the certainty that we have in our
determinations of chemical structures. Rather, patents attach to the exact
chemical structure of the drug, allowing pharmaceutical companies to violate
the spirit of the natural products exception, which is intended to preclude
patent protection for mere discovery-that is, for simply finding something that
exists in nature, without any extraordinary search. In our example, the essential
discovery was that structures bearing the dihydroxyl head'04 of the lovastatin
molecule fit into the active site of an enormously complex enzyme, thereby
inhibiting its natural function. Protecting this aspect of the discovery must be
the goal of a biodiversity patent scheme if it intends to value accurately the
contribution of these natural resources to the progression of science and to the
general welfare. Lovastatin is therefore a model for the sort of original
discovery whose contribution to welfare must be fully protected under the Rio
101. Melissa Shon, The Big Issue: Explosive Growth in Cholesterol-Reducing Therapies is Piquing
Drug Finns' Interest and Unleashing Price Competition, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Mar. 9, 1992, at
SR36. Fear of igniting a patent litigation war often inhibits pharmaceutical companies from pursuing claims
against their competitors when the stakes are small. Pravachol might be found to infringe on Merck's
compounds if a suit were brought, but lovastatin itself might be found to fall under the naturally occurring
substance exception in the course of this litigation. Since such cribbing is common in the pharmaceutical
industry, Squibb might respond by suing on all of the patents it held which Merck had subsequently
infringed. Given the marketing jump and free media attention Merck had with "Mevacor," it probably will
choose not to pursue any claims of infringement for these reasons. Annual sales for all cholesterol-lowering
drugs were projected to be $1.6 billion in 1992, with Merck's "Mevacor" (lovastatin) holding 61% of the
market. Id "Pravastatin" (another name for Pravachol) is also a "natural fermentation product," i.e., it is
manufactured by bacteria. See U.S. Patent No. 4,857,546. The same drug is marketed in Japan by Sankyo
under the name "Mevalotin," a product of discoveries simultaneous with lovastatin's. See supra note 93.
Because Sankyo had little overseas marketing experience, it licensed the drug to Bristol-Myers Squibb for
release in the United States. Japan's Medicine Men Take Aim, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), Mar. 2, 1991,
at 61, 61; see also Joseph Weber, Merck Needs More Gold from the White Coats, Bus. WK., Mar. 18,
1991, at 102, 104 (reporting that "Prava," another name for Pravastatin/Pravachol, was scheduled for U.S.
release in late 1991).
102. Shon, supra note 101 (citing Hemant Shah). Shah was "a Merck marketing veteran." Weber,
supra note 101, at 103.
103. Shon, supra note 101 (emphasis added).
104. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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Convention, whereas simvastatin is a model for the sort of de facto infringer
which not only deserves no patent protection of its own, 5 but whose use
should also be an actionable patent infringement under a Rio-inspired patent
scheme.
The remainder of this Note begins by exploring the three features of
existing patent law that might protect a natural product's chemical structure
patent from semi-synthetic pretenders. The first involves a special type of
original claim, a "Markush claim," capable of encompassing within its literal
scope the whole class of chemical structures to which the natural product
belonged. The second is the doctrine of obviousness, which might permit
rejection of claims for a copycat substance, if the state of knowledge in the
field before its creation rendered it obvious. The third is the doctrine of
equivalents, which allows an ex post extension of an original claim to
encompass the area covered by a newer compound, based on an after-the-fact
finding that the new substance performs the same practical function as the one
first claimed. Unfortunately, each of these doctrines, as applied today, is
inadequate to accomplish the goals of the Rio Convention. This Note therefore
concludes by proposing some fundamental changes in the system of patents on
chemical structures that could potentially provide full protection for the fruits
of biological diversity.
A. Original Claims Utilizing Markush Groups
One way to preempt the copycat infringer problem is to state the original
literal claim for the naturally occurring pharmaceutical as a "Markush claim"
that includes all variants expected to share exactly the same utility. The
Markush doctrine evolved in response to our patent system's now-defunct
prohibition on the use of alternative .language in the wording of patent claims.
For example, a claim on a new type of bottle could not list the material as
"glass or plastic," but would rather have to use a single generic term that
encompasses both.10 6 However, there is often "no commonly accepted
generic expression which is commensurate in scope with the field which the
105. Even if a copycat drug such as simvastatin were found not to infringe the original patent, it might
still have no value without a distinct patent of its own, because a pharmaceutical company might not be
willing to invest the capital needed for FDA testing, see supra note 92, without being able to rely on a
patent to protect its product from literal copying. This assumes, however, that any semi-synthetic drug
would have to go through a full new-drug application for FDA approval, and not the cheaper, abbreviated
application process allowed for generic versions of old drugs whose patents have expired. See supra note
62. Although this seems likely under current law, any decision on this matter is subject to administrative
discretion. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C) (1988).
106. 2 DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.06[2] (1992). The original purpose of the doctrine was to avoid
the "'difficulty or impossibility of determining the precise limits of the alleged invention"' if a patent claim
for such an invention could use alternative language. Id. § 8.06[2][a] (quoting Ex parte Reid, 15 Off. Gaz.
Pat. Office 882 (Comm'r Pat. 1879)).
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applicant desires to cover."'0 7 In such cases, the applicant may use a "coined
subgeneric group" to describe the elements he wishes to claim-for example,
a chemical synthesis might be described as involving, at one stage, material




Markush claims for chemical compounds "routinely embrace minor
variations on the basic structure the inventor [has] discovered. For example,
a patentee might claim a compound of structure 'Atom 1-Atom 2-Sidegroup,'
where 'Sidegroup' is defined in the claim as including either 'N-O-O-H' or
'N-H2."" 09 In the lovastatin/simvastatin example, it might be useful to
identify the discovery as the basic active structure common to the molecules
(the dihydroxyl head), attached to any one of a group of sidegroups (inert tail
ends). The primary difficulty with this solution is that the applicant would have
to guess which species of broadly inert compounds could be expected to have
no effect on the drug's basic (HMG-CoA inhibiting) function when attached
to the core molecule, because seeking proof would delay the application for the
patent, and thus the disclosure of the invention, until after tests had been
conducted."0 Several years elapsed between the discovery of lovastatin and
the discovery of its very close analogue simvastatin-by no means an
insignificant potential delay in the introduction of a breakthrough drug. In
addition, the late 1980's saw the discovery of several other synthetic
compounds which share the active part of the lovastatin structure and have
similar in vitro activity, but differ radically in the structure of the lower part
of the molecule.' Such radical differences are problematic for a Markush-
type claim, since "[t]he materials set forth in the Markush group ordinarily
must belong to a recognized physical or chemical class or to an art-recognized
class.""'  The variety of inactive elements that could be substituted into the
107. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 706,03(y) (5th ed. 14th rev. 1992) [hereinafter MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE].
108. 2 CHISUM, supra note 106, § 8.0612]. This type of claim was first sanctioned in Ex parte
Markush, 1925 C.D. 126, 340 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 839 (Comm'r. Pat. 1925).
109. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 897 n.261 (1990).
110. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 107, § 715.03 (stating that priority
cannot be obtained by claiming, subsequent to PTO review, a disclosed but unclaimed member of the
Markush group, i.e., an element similar to those disclosed as part of Markush group at time of filing claim,
but not actually included in that group). Guessing at the probable effect (or lack of effect, in this case) on
the activity of proposed members of the Markush group may be difficult. "Markush claims must be
provided with support... for each member of the ... group. Where the constitution and formula of a
chemical compound is stated only as a probability or speculation, the disclosure is not sufficient to support
claims identifying the compound by such composition or formula." Id. § 608.01(p).
I 11. ZEELEN, supra note 94, at 56-57; G.E. Stokker et al., 3-Hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A
Reductase Inhibitors, 29 J. MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 170 (1986) (discovered by Merck); E. Baader et al.,
Synthesis of a Novel HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitor, 29 TETRAHEDRON LETrERS 929 (1988) (by Hoechst);
N. Balasubramanian et al., A Potent, 7issue-Selective Synthetic Inhibitor of HMG-CoA Reductase, 32 J.
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 2038 (1989) (by Bristol Myers).
112. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 107, § 706.03(y). Even in process or
combination (multiple compound) claims, members of the group must
1993]
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core lovastatin structure may be greater than our patent system is ready to
allow within the scope of one claim.
B. Obviousness
The European Patent Office (EPO) employs an obvious desideratum test
for rejecting patents on inventions that are "obvious to try..'. 3 This, the
English "Cripps test," applies to an invention when it is "for all practical
purposes obvious to any skilled chemist in the state of chemical
knowledge... that he could manufacture valuable therapeutic agents" by
making the product claimed by the process claimed."' The first in the race
to realize something "obvious to try" has not earned a broad legal
monopoly."' Unfortunately, American courts do not acknowledge this logic,
and therefore researchers sometimes file a U.S. patent application before the
completion of all actual experimental work.1
6
Where a claim is part of a "logical progression from what has gone
before," 7 as when a chemical structure differs slightly from a known
structure in a manner thought to be unlikely to cause radical changes in the
utility of the substance, the EPO finds inventiveness only if properties "flow
from the structure in an unpredictable manner. Inventiveness is therefore a
combination of a structure and an unexpected utility or degree of utility."" 8
In analogous American cases, a showing of "unexpected properties" has been
required for patentability where a sufficient structural similarity exists.
Sufficiency is determined by the patent examiner's view of whether "one
skilled in the relevant chemical art [would have] the motivation to make close
possess at least one property in common which is mainly responsible for their function in the
claimed relationship, and it is clear from their very nature or from the prior art that all of them
possess this property. While in the past [this test] was applied as liberally as possible, present
practice which holds that claims reciting Markush groups are not generic claims ...may
subject the groups to a more stringent test for propriety of the recited members.
Id.; see also id. § 803.02 (discussing "unity of invention," found to exist where the compounds listed "(I)
share a common utility and (2) share a substantial structural feature disclosed as being essential to that
utility"). In In re Schechter, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated the principle thus in the
context of chemical structure claims: The Markush group is acceptable "where the substances grouped have
a community of chemical and physical characteristics which justify their inclusion in a common group, and
such inclusion is not repugnant to the principles of scientific classification." 205 F.2d 185, 189 (C.C.P.A.
1953) (emphasis added). Thus, a Markush group for lovastatin-type compound tail ends including "all alkyl
groups shorter than four carbons," see supra note 98, would be acceptable, but one including all the many
complex and unclassifiable inert substituents that would function probably would not.
113. The U.S. Patent Office has utilized this standard in the past. See, e.g., In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d
928, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
114. Sharpe & Dohme Inc. v. Boots Pure Drug Co., 45 R.P.D. & T.M. 153, 173, 176 (C.A. 1927).
115. Crespi, supra note 77, at 361 (discussing In re Genentech Inc., 1989 R.P.D. & T.M. 147, a
British case holding a product-by-process claim to be obvious in light of knowledge about the structure of
the final product).
116. Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents-A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 768,
781 (1969).
117. Crespi, supra note 77, at 351.
118. Id. at 353.
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relatives.., of the prior art compound(s)."" 9 If two compounds have a
sufficient structural similarity, a prima facie case of obviousness is
established-so long as some information in the prior art specifically motivates
or suggests the changes.' Evidence of similar utility would merely add
weight to this prima facie case.
The motivation requirement makes it harder to establish obviousness in the
United States. Here, a patent application may not be rejected as obvious simply
because the claimed invention was "obvious to try." In In re O'Farrell,1
2
the court cited two situations it had in mind as merely obvious to try but not
obvious under American patent law:
In some cases, what would have been "obvious to try" would have
been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices
until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art
gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be
successful. In others, what was "obvious to try" was to explore a new
technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field
of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as
to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve
it.1
22
Although look-alike pharmaceuticals such as simvastatin will frequently be
"obvious to try" in this sense, they will rarely be so "obvious" as to justify the
denial of a new patent under the narrow American standard of obviousness,
which applies only when the prior art allows one to predict the effects of
specific structural modifications. However, the way in which any sort of
structural modification will affect the utility of a pharmaceutical is hard to
predict ahead of time,'23 since even small structural changes have been
known to cause radical shifts in utility. As a result, obviousness will provide
little protection for Rio-inspired patents on biodiversity resources against de
facto infringement by copycat compounds.
119. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1682
(1991).
120. On "suggestion," see In re Ball Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1491, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1991). On
these tests generally, see James NV. Badie, "Motivation" or "Obvious to Try"--Is There a Difference? Is
It a Proper Test of Obviousness?, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 54, 61-66 (1993).
121. 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 903 (citations omitted).
123. No prima facie case of obviousness is established when the prior art does not allow one to predict
similarities in utility on the basis of structural similarities. In re Kudera, 426 F.2d 385, 389-90 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
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C. Equivalents
The equitable doctrine of equivalents effectively extends patent rights to
cover products that do not infringe upon the literal terms of the original patent
claim but that nonetheless perform "substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the patented
invention.124 Under this standard, establishing the functional equivalence of
"look-alike" drugs requires claimants to prove not only that the clinical effects
of the drugs are identical, but also that the biological mechanisms triggered by
them are the same. Sometimes courts infer such equivalence in biological
activity from structural similarities.125 Unfortunately, even under the most
generous standards of legal proof, it is difficult to establish that two different
structures function by exactly the same mechanism, even when (as in the case
of the lovastatin family and its inactive tail-end) information about the enzyme
and substrate geometries reasonably indicates that a similar biological
mechanism is at work.126 Because the doctrine of equivalents may be used
to expand the scope of the original patent monopoly retroactively, courts have
traditionally tried to limit its application by relying on putatively objective
standards, such as structure. As noted in the previous Section, the fact that tiny
structural modifications have sometimes resulted in important pharmaceutical
innovations may lead courts to err on the side of caution and to limit findings
of equivalents.127
While devices such as Markush groups are useful for expanding the literal
scope of a chemical structure patent, the doctrine of equivalents makes it
124. Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878); see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 and 485 U.S. 1009 (1988), the Federal Circuit appeared to
substantially modify this standard for finding equivalents by establishing the so-called "all-elements rule":
"Every claim element or its equivalent must be present in an accused device for that claim to read on the
accused device." William E. Player, Elemental Equivalence: Interpreting "Substantially the Same Way"
Under Pennwalt After Coming Glass, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 546, 546 n.3 (1989) (citing
4 CHISUM, supra note 106, § 18.03[4]). Pennwalt seemed to sound the death knell of the doctrine of
equivalents by merging literal infringement and equivalent infringement; the same features used to defeat
literal infringement were being used to defeat a finding of equivalents. 833 F.2d at 947 (Bennett, J.,
dissenting in part). Subsequent decisions have, however, limited this result. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works
v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259-61 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In any event, the potential impact
of Pennwalt on patents involving chemical products is uncertain, since chemical structure claims are usually
not distinguishable into separate elements to the same degree that mechanical inventions are.
125. In In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1969), the court held that a stereoisomer of
a previously patented compound was not patentable without a showing of novel biological effect.
126. See supra text accompanying note 97.
127. Note that under this standard, a showing of any slight difference in clinical function would protect
a claimed look-alike compound from a finding of equivalents. The court in In re Georges Jolles, 628 F.2d
1322 (C.C.P.A. 1980), found that a claimed anticancer agent, though structurally similar to a previously
patented anticancer compound, was slightly more efficacious in causing remission in early clinical
trials-53% of the patients went into remission, as opposed to some presumably lower number for the
prior-art drug. This provided the "requisite utility" to overcome the obvious structural similarities and avoid
a finding of equivalents. The court emphasized that the structural similarities did not make Jolles'
compound prima facie obvious under the prior art.
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possible to expand the effective scope of a patent beyond the bounds of its
literal claim. The extent of the effective expansion typically reflects the nature
of the original invention.12 8 Donald Chisum describes three categories of
original claims: "pioneers, entitled to a broad range of equivalents; marked
improvements, entitled to a substantial range of equivalents; and narrow
improvements, entitled to a limited or no range of equivalents."' 9 A newly
discovered compound occurring in nature should qualify as one of Chisum's
pioneers "because, unlike new compounds produced through chemical
synthesis, a newly discovered [substance] having a novel activity or 'function'
could not have been 'predicted' or even contemplated prior to its actual
discovery.' 30 Thus, pharmaceuticals derived from biodiversity resources
should be entitled to a broad range of equivalents.
Two problems complicate the use of equivalents doctrine to protect an
LDC's equitable interest in its naturally occurring pharmaceuticals from look-
alike piracy. The first is judicial uncertainty concerning so-called "new or
unknown equivalents." Under older cases, the term "new equivalent" applies
to an invention which substitutes some newly discovered element, ingredient,
or technology into the original invention without changing its utility or
function. Traditionally, such "new equivalents" were held not to infringe a
patent on the original invention, and their use could therefore not be enjoined
under the doctrine of equivalents. 3  Under this traditional approach, the
doctrine of equivalents would not protect the holders of biodiversity patents if
semi-synthetic knock-offs were deemed to be non-infringing "new
equivalents." More recently, however, lower federal courts have taken the
opposite position: the fact that a newly created substance did not exist at the
time of an earlier claim does not preclude a finding that the new compound is
an infringing equivalent of the old. 32 The Supreme Court has declined to
128. See Jeffrey P. Kushan, Protein Patents and the Doctrine of Equivalents: Limits on the Expansion
of Patent Rights, 6 HIGH TECH. LJ. 109, 129 n.74 (1991); see also Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483
F.2d 858, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1973).
129. 4 CHISUM, supra note 106, § 18.04[2].
130. Kushan, supra note 128, at 138 (discussing proteins).
131. Gould v. Rees, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 187, 192-93 (1872). But see Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Boston
Incandescent Lamp Co., 62 F. 397 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (holding new equivalent infringing). Paradoxically,
some patent-scope minimalists view the doctrine of equivalents as fulfilling its "sole legitimate function"
when applied to "new equivalents," where, they believe, the doctrine protects the reliance interests of
patentees by "ensur[ing] that patent protection is not eviscerated by technology developed after the patent
issues when claims that would cover the technology literally are unavailable under reissue and were
unavailable during the original prosecution." Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673,728(1989).
132. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 109, at 855 n.74 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1382
(CL Cl. 1979); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F2d 1070, 1080-81 (Ct. Cl. 1976); and Eastern Rotorcraft
v. United States, 397 F.2d 978, 981 (Ct. Cl. 1968)). These more recent lower court opinions depart from
the approach of older Supreme Court cases, such as Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605 (1950).
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review Federal Circuit decisions that state the currently prevailing view that
new technologies can constitute equivalents. 133 Thus, today the doctrine of
equivalents probably could be applied to look-alike pharmaceuticals that are
developed after a naturally occurring substance has been patented.
The second objection is more intractable, however, because it is directed
against the entire doctrine of equivalents: since similarities between the
structure and functioning of two related chemicals are always a matter of
degree open to subjective evaluation,"3 the doctrine provides no clear limit
to the post hoc expansion of a monopoly right originally granted for disclosure
of a discrete discovery. To a greater or lesser extent, every finding of
equivalents dispenses with the requirement of literalness for patent applications
and extends monopoly protection to what is, in the view of the deciding court
or administrative body, the non-literal substance of the original invention. In
the words of Learned Hand, a finding of equivalents stretches the literal terms
of a patent claim to "cover more than their meaning will bear."'135 The
doctrine of equivalents denies form in a field that is generally characterized by
literal formalism.
These objections suggest that findings of equivalents should be limited to
a select class of cases, even for the category of "pioneer" patents that includes
most phytochemical discoveries. Under the "prospect theory" of patent scope
developed by Edmund Kitch 36 and elaborated by Robert Merges and
Richard Nelson,137 patents should be construed to have the broadest scope, and
thus to be entitled to the broadest class of equivalents, when they cover
inventions in fields characterized by the "discrete invention model."' 38 These
types of inventions are "discrete and well defined," and, while the original
breakthrough may be subject to piecemeal improvement,
it is implicit that [the invention] does not point the way to wide
ranging subsequent technical advances. It does not define any broad
prospect.... For inventions and industries like these, while tight and
broad control of a particular invention may enable a firm to profit
handsomely, possession by that firm of a proprietary lock on the
133. See, e.g., United States v. Decca Ltd., 454 U.S. 819 (1981), denying cert. to 640 F.2d 1156 (Ct.
Cl. 1980).
134. As Learned Hand noted, going beyond the literal terms of a patent to cover ."substantially
similar' variants" of the original claim "is always a question of degree, and courts have differed, and
always will differ, as to the allowable latitude in a given instance.' Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 168 E2d 691, 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948).
135. Id. at 692. Patents tend to be construed as widely as possible during the examination period and
as narrowly as possible afterwards, a two-stage selection in favor of literal interpretation. See Giles S. Rich,
Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-A U.S. Perspective, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499, 503 (1990).
136. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266,
276 (1977).
137. Merges & Nelson, supra note 109.
138. Id. at 880.
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invention is not a serious hindrance to inventive work by many other
firms.
139
In these discrete invention fields-such as pharmaceuticals-new inventions
generally do not appropriate prior art elements whole and, conversely, are
rarely amenable to incorporation as elements of some other, subsequent
invention. 40
In discrete invention fields, construing the scope of patents broadly-and
therefore finding equivalents readily-provides a strong incentive for the
creation of new inventions. At the same time, the broad scope of patents in
these fields does not have the negative economic effect of discouraging work
towards improvements on the breakthrough. This is because breakthroughs in
a "discrete invention" field are usually amenable to incremental improvement
that can be efficiently orchestrated by a single rights holder but are not
amenable to incorporation in a wide range of subsequent inventions. In this
respect, discrete invention fields stand in marked contrast to fields
characterized by "cumulative invention," in which "advances build on and
interact with many other features of the existing technology .... [Ilnventions
may enhance some feature of a prior 'dominant design,' or they may be
incorporated into subsequent inventions, or both.' 14 1 In fields in which
cumulative invention predominates, it is unlikely that one firm, if given broad
patent rights, could orchestrate the further development of an initial
breakthrough as efficiently as the competitive market can. Narrow judicial
interpretations of patent scope foster this kind of competitive market by sharply
delimiting the monopoly granted to pathbreaking or pioneering patent claims.
This type of market competition is unnecessary in discrete invention fields,
because pioneering inventions in those fields usually cannot be incorporated
into a wide range of subsequent inventions, but can instead only be
incrementally improved in a manner that a single rights holder can orchestrate.
Thus, the post hoe expansion of patent scope through findings of
equivalents is inefficient only in fields characterized by cumulative advances
in technology, rather than by discrete invention. But most pharmaceutical
advances resulting from phytochemical research are in fact insular discoveries
that are not predictably related to future advances or improvements, and they
therefore do not fit the cumulative technologies model. Because of "the
complex and unpredictable relationship between chemical structure and
function,"'42  pharmaceuticals belong in the "discrete inventions"
category.
143
139. Id. at 880-81.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 881-82 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 882-83.
143. Id. at 880, 897; see also Richard C. Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological
Performance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 424, 427 (1988) (placing drug development in
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Merges and Nelson agree that small variations in chemical structure
usually improve function only incrementally. But small changes also
occasionally work radical shifts in clinical effect. 44 These occasional
departures from the discrete invention model may explain why courts seem to
prefer narrow interpretations of pharmaceutical patent scope rather than broad
findings of equivalents: construing patents narrowly and literally promotes a
competitive market conducive to cumulative advances in technology. At the
same time, the ease with which new chemical structure patents can be obtained
for analogues of naturally occurring substances, as in our simvastatin example,
is another consideration pointing in the same direction-away from the
doctrine of equivalents as a practical way of protecting LDC rights in
biodiversity pharmaceuticals.
D. Rethinking Chemical Structure Patents
The patent system as we have it today was really very little
changed by the Patent Act of 1952; it goes back to a period when
invention was largely mechanical, followed by an electrical era. In
both, invention was chiefly of physical objects. The language and
much of the judicial treatment of the statutes is geared to that sort of
invention. When chemical invention became more frequent ...a
problem arose of fitting chemical invention into a mold of words and
a habit of thinking that were not developed with it in mind.
45
The discussion to this point has shown the need for biodiversity patents to
extend beyond mere chemical structure to their utility or clinical efficacy.
Largely for reasons of clarity and convenience, American patents have until
now attached solely to chemical structures. The supposed utility of a claimed
chemical compound is only at issue when the patent is being reviewed. Once
awarded, the right granted enjoins others from using the patented structure for
any purpose, even a newly discovered one.
Though "chemical diagram" patent protection has been a historical fixture,
the utility requirement for gaining a patent has not. Before the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals' (CCPA) decision in In re Bremner,'46 the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) enforced no "specific utility" requirement.
"[A] patent was granted almost automatically on a new chemical compound
without any showing of utility."' 47 The present utility requirement was
discrete invention category, at least before "genetic revolution").
144. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
145. John Hoxie, A Patent Attomey's View, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 630, 636 (1965).
146. 182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (denying patent application with no description of utility).
147. Eggert, supra note 116, at 782.
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developed in two 1967 CCPA decisions, In re Kirk148 and In re Joly,149
holding that chemical "tinker toys"--useful only in the furtherance of research
when used as intermediates in synthesizing compounds with specific
utilities-fail the basic utility test of the Patent Act.'50 This position, which
had been set forth by the Supreme Court one year earlier in Brenner v.
Manson,' did not deny the usefulness of these types of research tools but
concluded that, as one commentator put it, "the potential reward in a basically
untested chemical has become so enormous that . . a 17 year monopoly
should not be granted until something more substantial is given in exchange
than the disclosure that the compound exists.'
52
This line of thinking complements the more venerable new-use doctrine,
which precludes patents for newly discovered uses of a compound that either
has already been patented or is an unpatentable product of nature. 53 As In
re Thuau states, the original patent holder for the compound is "entitled to
every use of which his invention is susceptible.' ' 4 In Thuau, the applicant
found that a patented leather tanning solution had a therapeutic medical value
for treating cervicitis, but he received no rights from the Patent Office or the
CCPA in exchange for his investigatory diligence. Later courts have sometimes
deviated from the Thuau doctrine for new-use claims that are stated as process
patents,5 s allowing the first patentee broad and easily enforceable rights over
the compound itself (i.e., its chemical structure), 156 while giving the second,
new-use patentee the right only to "preclude others from using the chemical
in the exact manner he has disclosed. He acquires no right to produce the
compound, to sell it, or even to use it.' 57 The inequity of this system is
148. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
149. 376 .2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
151. 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
152. Eggert, supra note 116, at 773 (emphasis omitted).
153. No one has control over availability of the compound if it is a product of nature, otherwise
known but never patented, or if the patent on it has expired. A new-use discoverer cannot in these cases
assert the full chemical structure patent that an original discoverer could have. Id. at 780 n.67.
154. 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
155. This usage has been allowed since the 1952 Patent Act's modification of § 100(b): "The term
'process' . . . includes a new use of a known.., composition of matter, or material." Still, this provision
is not thought to overrule Thuau in its entirety and to eliminate the "dominant" and "subservient"
relationship, see infra note 157, of old-compound and new-use patents. See P.J. Federico, Commentary on
the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 16-17 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
161 (1993); 1 CISUM, supra note 106, § 1.03[8]. In the words of a more recent Second Circuit opinion:
Patents are not granted for the natural properties inherent in things existing in ... nature,
although they may be granted for things an inventor does with those properties.... A new use
for an old material does not make the material patentable. But the new use or application of an
old material may be patentable. Similarly, a process or method which involves only a new use
of an old material is patentable.
Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 679 F.2d 1023, 1029 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
156. Enforcement of the first inventor's patent may be carried out at the manufacturing level. Since
the new-use patentee has rights that must be asserted at the user level, enforcement is more difficult.
Eggert, supra note 116, at 781.
157. Eggert, supra note 116, at 781. See also 4 CHISUM, supra note 106, § 16.02[4] ("One does not
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obvious. "The first inventor ... discloses one use, yet is 'paid' for all,"' 8
for she receives a patent in the chemical structure of the compound. This sort
of arrangement might be equitable for patents on machines, which are tailored
by their inventors to be ideal for one type of use, but biochemical inventions
usually function by mechanisms dictated by nature and little understood by
their discoverers. The patent system in these cases ought to encourage the
search for uses per se, and not for useful compounds as it does now.
Despite its inequity as a system for compensating human efforts,'59
something resembling a structure patent is exactly the sort of protection needed
for biodiversity chemical structures. An LDC should be able to control the
exploitation of its biodiversity resources regardless of the purpose for which
they are used. Biodiversity patents should therefore be interpreted to subsume
all routine manufacturing processes leading to the chemical structure, as well
as use rights over the traditional medicinal use. 60 At the same time, a drug
company that uncovers a hitherto unknown use for an already patented,
medicinally useful phytochemical could receive, in exchange for its
investigatory effort, a patent on the specific use. It would then have the ability
to contract exclusively with the LDC for the specific right to exploit that
specific new use.
Replacing patents on chemical structures with patents for specific uses
would not completely solve the Rio piracy problem, but it might help refocus
infringement actions on utility. Under a Rio-inspired patent scheme, patents for
uses and manufacturing processes would still refer to structures, but structure
would not occupy the same central position in defining patent scope that it
does now. Lay judges, notoriously unsure of themselves in patent cases,
t6 '
currently resolve equivalents controversies conservatively because they focus
almost exclusively on the literal claim of the chemical structure diagram. Use
escape infringement by using a patented invention for a purpose not contemplated or disclosed by the
patentee."). In these situations the first patent, on the chemical structure, is known as the dominant patent;
the second, on the new use, is known as the subservient patent, or the blocking patent, since its holder may
block the holder of the compound patent from using the compound for the newly discovered use. See
Merges & Nelson, supra note 109, at 860-61.
158. Eggert, supra note 116, at 781.
159. Considering biodiversity resources as natural resources, however, this mode of compensation for
their use is neither inequitable nor inconsistent with values embodied in other laws dealing with rights to
such resources. Again, this is because biodiversity patents serve the "prospect function" of patent grants,
not the "reward function." See Kitch, supra note 136, at 271-75 (describing patent system as method of
resource allocation analogous to mineral claims).
160. Ideally, a synthesis for the structure would be relatively easy to devise and execute. If not, the
LDC could be given rights in the extraction process only. VinbIastine, for example, eludes a complete
synthesis; the drug is still harvested--today from cell cultures of the rosy periwinkle, but until recently
from the leaves of the plant itself. MYERS, supra note 7, at 200; see also id. at 92, 107. The private sector
could compete to produce a workable synthesis, and, with its first-medical-use rights, the LDC would still
be in a good position to extract a high share of the rents from any resulting marketed product.
161. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 E2d 1315, 1340 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
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patents would demand more subtle boundary-drawing between inventions
because they would highlight distinctions in utility rather than structure.1 62
Of course, the scope of such "use" patents might be construed as narrowly
as structure patents on pharmaceuticals are now. If the doctrine of equivalents
does not develop sufficiently to cover look-alike piracy, a "distinct efficacy"
requirement could be imposed on obtaining patents for new pharmaceuticals.
Equivalents doctrine currently embodies a two-step test: newcomers are non-
infringing either (1) if they possess a minimally distinct structure or (2) if, in
the absence of a distinct structure, they demonstrate some unexpected
utility-a distinct efficacy. The distinct efficacy test would require inventors
to present more information in support of their claims for a new patent. This
information would also elucidate the relationship between structural changes
and efficacy changes. 63 According to the prospect theory of patent scope,
this relationship would determine whether broad or narrow patent scope should
be allowed with respect to the use patent on the senior drug. If the relationship
between small structural variations and function were predictable, the older
patents would be construed broadly, since the original firm could be counted
on to develop the product efficiently without market competition. But, if small
changes did produce surprising variations in utility, then a narrow judicial
construction of the patent would promote maximally efficient competition in
these areas, with their relatively unlimited potentials for discovery."
A distinct efficacy test might be implemented in a number of ways through
the presently existing regulatory apparatus governing new pharmaceuticals.
Most obviously, the PTO could require a patent applicant to demonstrate the
distinct efficacy of its new pharmaceutical in order to satisfy the utility
requirement of the Patent Act. 65 Before the early 1960's, when Congress
162. Eggert, supra note 116, at 788.
163. All evaluations of patent scope benefit from being reviewed "in light of later technological
developments." Merges & Nelson, supra note 109, at 911. Our current system resolves hard cases through
the ex post vehicle of litigation, rather than demanding a more rigorous examination of the initial
application, which is usually granted in doubtful cases.
164. Such a system raises concers about the propriety of asking one party to provide expensive-to-
obtain data that might end up increasing the value of the opponent's property while producing no return
for its originator. An administrative scheme to compensate the producer of data could be devised; such a
scheme was upheld against constitutional challenge in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S.
568 (1985). Because producing the data needed to obtain regulatory approval is expensive, see supra note
92, the expropriation of such data is a prime concern of the pharmaceutical industry-almost as great a
concern as patent expropriation. See, e.g., C.L. Clemente, A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE, supra note 74, at 127,
127.
165. In Germany, a requirement that all patentable inventions display some "technical progress" over
the prior state of the art was once part of the basic criteria of nonobviousness (called an "inventive step"
in Europe). Wolfgang G. Fasse, Basic Patentability Requirements in the United States and Germany, 44
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 27, 32-37 (1962); Frithjof E. MUller & Harold C. Wegner, The 1976 German Patent
Law, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 89, 116-17 (1977) (describing elimination of requirement). Note that Congress'
power under the Patent Clause is granted in order to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,"
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); this phrasing suggests that patents should be granted only
if the distinct efficacy of a claimed invention is demonstrated.
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expanded the FDA's regulatory powers over the pharmaceutical market,'66
a showing of utility was a significant requirement for obtaining a patent on a
new pharmaceutical. 67 Since then, the utility requirement for patents on new
pharmaceuticals has become substantially looser.'6 The PTO's current
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure states that patent applications shall be
examined "recognizing that other agencies [e.g., the FDA] ... have been
assigned the responsibility of assuring conformance to the standards established
by statute for the advertisement, use, sale or distribution of drugs."'169 Of
course, Congress has the power to rearrange these responsibilities as it sees fit
and to instruct the PTO to require a showing of distinct efficacy before
granting a patent on a new pharmaceutical. Alternatively, a distinct efficacy
test could be made a part of the safety regulations administered by the
FDA. 7 ' Unfortunately, while patent doctrines and the institutions that
enforce them are similar across the globe, the national administrative systems
that presently oversee the pharmaceutical industry vary greatly from country
to country. As a result, regulatory solutions to problems of pharmaceutical
patent scope may be difficult to implement in a uniform manner at the
international level.
Any regime that eliminates structure patents or introduces a distinct
efficacy test would increase the work of the patent office, the courts, or both.
But within the field of laboratory chemical research, eliminating structure
patents would "restore a balance between reward and contribution.''. And
with respect to pharmaceuticals patterned on a protected natural structure,
introducing a distinct efficacy test would force drug companies to decide
whether they anticipate proving a new effect before they attempt to develop
look-alike semi-synthetics. Thus, the distinct efficacy test would end the
166. See supra note 4 (describing Kefauver-Harris amendments).
167. See Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1957) (stating that patent grant places
government's moral imprimatur on product). Isenstead is cited as an example of a line of cases stretching
back to the turn of the century in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINES 425 (3d ed. rev. 1993).
168. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 167, at 425. Compare In re Krimmel, 292 F2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(holding that animal testing meets utility test by proving usefulness in treating animals) with In re Hartop,
311 F2d 249, 257 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (holding that animal testing demonstrates "a sufficient probability of
safety in human therapy ... to satisfy the requirement ... that appellants' invention be useful"). Recall
that the Kefauver-Harris amendments were enacted in 1962.
169. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 107, § 608.01(p)(A)(2).
170. This alternative approach could also be prudent from a safety perspective. The greater the number
of structural variants a population uses to treat the same medical complaint, the higher the chance is of
provoking some unforeseen side effect. Currently, breakthrough drugs tend to move through the regulatory
system more rapidly than do follow-up drugs that clinically show only incremental improvements on the
prior art. See Janet Aker, After the Storm: New Drugs Poised at FDA, MEDICAL MARKETING & MEDIA,
Jan. 1990, at 18, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MEDNET File (discussing slow progress of
simvastatin through regulatory bureaucracy, as against lovastatin's rapid approval: The "FDA is not inclined
to give follow-ups the same fast track as the breakthrough compound").
171. Eggert, supra note 116, at 787.
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current wasteful, duplicative practice of pursuing variant structures merely for
market positioning against competitors.
171
V. CONCLUSION
When viewed abstractly, it is difficult to balance the long-term costs of
losing biodiversity against the potential administrative and efficiency costs of
a redistributive scheme that would allow LDC's to extract full economic rents
from users of their biodiversity resources. Empirical research alone will not
disclose the most efficient global approach to this problem, because the costs
and benefits of any potential solution are dispersed over space and time and
reflect incommensurate needs. Fortunately, this analysis of costs and benefits
need not be undertaken in the abstract. The Rio Convention expresses the
international determination that biodiversity resources are to be valued highly
and that such resources should therefore be protected by patent rights. Having
made this value determination, policymakers should also realize that it need
not create unintended inefficiencies in the development of new
pharmaceuticals, because a single rights holder, such as an LDC state with a
Rio-inspired biodiversity patent, will be able to orchestrate further development
just as efficiently as the market can.
173
Like the more familiar heuristic, hit-or-miss synthetic research,
phytochemical prospecting tends to produce breakthrough drugs, discrete leaps
forward in the state of the art. For both normative and economic reasons, these
types of advances demand broad protective scope, and in other areas they often
receive it. Unfortunately, existing patent doctrines usually give look-alike
pharmaceuticals the benefit of the doubt. Obviousness, an ex ante concept,
offers little protection to the scope of Rio-inspired biodiversity patents,
especially in light of the judicial interpretation of this doctrine in the United
States. The doctrine of equivalents is more promising, because it involves an
ex post reexamination of the initial patent in the light of developments
occurring between the first grant and the copying. However, the practical
usefulness of the doctrine of equivalents is undermined by judicial reliance on
subjective evaluations of "structural similarity," from which equivalent
biochemical mechanisms are then inferred. 174  Decisionmakers could
strengthen this doctrine by focusing first on the issue of utility or efficacy,
rather than relying on structure to establish a prima facie case of equivalents.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 85-103.
173. This seems even more likely in light of the tendency of drug companies to invest in
marketing-usually of market-redundant goods-at a magnitude resembling that of their research budgets.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The basic scientific research establishment has recently been
criticized for generating extensive redundancy. See Grand Unified Experiments, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition),
May 1, 1993, at 18.
174. See, e.g., supra notes 125 & 127.
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The proposals made here would help the courts and patent office afford
pharmaceutical biodiversity resources the broad protective scope they need.
We must assume that most pharmaceutical biodiversity resources would
be developed regardless of the scope of Rio patents. But approaching this issue
without considering how LDC's might extract the maximum economic rents
from their biological diversity ignores the sizeable global efficiencies and the
welfare benefits for Third World nations that would result from the full
redistribution of these rents from North to South. Impoverished nations will be
more likely to conserve their biodiversity resources if conservation pays for
itself, and, from a global standpoint, conservation is a good long-term
investment. Perhaps more significantly, economic redistribution from North to
South could have a tremendous impact on the pharmaceutical industry in the
Third World, helping not only to preserve the biodiversity resources of poorer
nations, but also to finance badly needed indigenous pharmaceutical
companies. Such companies can address the Third World's need for drugs that
transnational corporations find unprofitable to develop.'75 Ironically, even
today many of the citizens of these nations have no choice but to rely on
plants and herbs as their primary pharmaceutical sources.
76
175. The public health needs of the underdeveloped world are primarily pediatric, whereas those in
the developed world are primarily geriatric. Carl Djerassi, Making Drugs (and Soaking the Poor?), 310
NATuRE 517 (1984). Agenda 21's elaboration on the terms of the Rio Convention endorses strengthening
the "endogenous capacities" of LDC's to develop self-sufficiency in the application of biotechnology. It
also proposes extending the usually short patent terms in LDC's, which would benefit transnational
pharmaceutical companies by expanding the patent protection available for their high-end products in the
Third World; in exchange, the big pharmaceutical companies are supposed to increase their research on the
health concerns of LDC populations. 2 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS, supra note 19, at 671,
674.
176. "Of the five billion people in the world, four billion depend to some extent on traditional, or
'folk,' remedies. Thanks to fashion and the rising cost of finding new drugs, the other billion are on their
way to following them." Medicinal Plants: Pills in a Haystack, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), Feb. 24, 1990,
at 87; see also Norman Farnsworth, Screening Plants for New Medicines, in BIODIVERSrrY, supra note 9,
at 83, 91.
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